

THIS PRINT COVERS CALENDAR ITEM NO.: 10.3

**SAN FRANCISCO
MUNICIPAL TRANSPORTATION AGENCY**

DIVISION: Capital Programs and Construction

BRIEF DESCRIPTION:

Approving the responses on behalf of the SFMTA and the Board of Directors to the findings and recommendations in the June 2021 Grand Jury Report regarding the Van Ness Corridor Transit Improvement Project.

SUMMARY:

- In June 2021, the San Francisco Civil Grand Jury issued a report entitled “Van Ness Avenue: What Lies Beneath” (Report), which, among other things, contains findings regarding the performance of City agencies, including the SFMTA, related to the Van Ness Corridor Transit Improvement Project. The Report also contains recommendations for City agencies on handling capital projects in the future.
- The Report requests responses from the SFMTA and its Board of Directors within 60 days, or no later than August 30, 2021. The Report also requests responses from the Mayor’s Office, the SFPUC and its General Manager, and the Board of Supervisors (within 90 days). The Report invites responses from San Francisco Public Works.

ENCLOSURES:

1. SFMTAB Resolution
2. June 2, 2021 Grand Jury Report
3. Responses to Findings and Recommendations

APPROVALS:

		DATE
DIRECTOR	 _____	<u>July 28, 2021</u>
SECRETARY	 _____	<u>July 27, 2021</u>

ASSIGNED SFMTAB CALENDAR DATE: August 3, 2021

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PURPOSE

Approving the responses on behalf of the SFMTA and the Board of Directors to the findings and recommendations in the June 2021 Grand Jury Report regarding the Van Ness Corridor Transit Improvement Project.

STRATEGIC PLAN GOALS AND TRANSIT FIRST POLICY PRINCIPLES

Not Applicable.

DESCRIPTION

Background

The Van Ness Corridor Transit Improvement Project (Project) will implement the first bus rapid transit (BRT) service in San Francisco, which will improve transit reliability for the 47 and 49 Muni routes and provide reliable transit connections to transfer routes. The ridership on these lines is historically about 45,000 passengers per day. The transit service and infrastructure changes are expected to reduce transit travel times by over 30 percent and increase ridership by about 33 percent.

Van Ness Avenue is a Vision Zero high-injury corridor. To improve safety, the Project will install pedestrian countdown timers, pedestrian bulb-outs, and eliminate the majority of left turns that currently exist along the corridor. In addition, the Project has replaced the City's 100-year-old sewer and water system along the length of the corridor, as well as selected sections of the auxiliary water supply system. The Project will also enhance the urban design of Van Ness Avenue.

The Project is about 78% completed. All the major underground sewer and water work has been completed. Currently, the contractor is constructing the BRT lanes, sidewalk, and traffic systems. The current Project schedule shows substantial completion by the end of 2021.

The Project has experienced more than two years of delays in construction due to various avoidable and unavoidable setbacks during the initial construction phase, which mostly consisted of underground work.

The Civil Grand Jury of the City and County of San Francisco examined the history and delivery of the Project. In June 2021, the Grand Jury issued a report entitled "Van Ness Avenue: What Lies Beneath" (Report), which, among other things, contains findings regarding the performance of City agencies, including the SFMTA, related to the Project. The Report also contains recommendations for City agencies on handling capital projects in the future. The Report is Enclosure 2, and the matrix with the findings and recommendations is Enclosure 3.

The Report requests responses from the SFMTA and its Board of Directors within 60 days, or no later than August 30, 2021. The Report also requests responses from the Mayor's Office, the SFPUC and its General Manager, and the Board of Supervisors (within 90 days). The Report invites responses from San Francisco Public Works.

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STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT

The SFMTA has conferred with other members of the Project team, which consists of the SFMTA, the San Francisco Public Utilities Commission (SFPUC), and San Francisco Public Works (SFPW) staff. The other agencies will be submitting separate responses to the Report, as will the Board of Supervisors and the Mayor's Office.

ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED

No alternatives were considered.

FUNDING IMPACT

There is no significant funding impact for responding to the Grand Jury Report.

ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW

On July 23, 2021, the SFMTA, under authority delegated by the Planning Department, determined that the June 2021 Civil Grand Jury Report is not a "project" under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) pursuant to Title 14 of the California Code of Regulations Sections 15060(c) and 15378(b).

A copy of the CEQA determination is on file with the Secretary to the SFMTA Board of Directors and is incorporated herein by reference.

OTHER APPROVALS RECEIVED OR STILL REQUIRED

The City Attorney's Office has reviewed this item.

RECOMMENDATION

Staff recommends that the SFMTA Board approve the responses on behalf of the SFMTA and the Board of Directors to the findings and recommendations in the June 2021 Grand Jury Report regarding the Van Ness Corridor Transit Improvement Project.

SAN FRANCISCO
MUNICIPAL TRANSPORTATION AGENCY
BOARD OF DIRECTORS

RESOLUTION No. _____

WHEREAS, The Civil Grand Jury of the City and County of San Francisco examined the history and delivery of the Project, and in June 2021, issued a report entitled “Van Ness Avenue: What Lies Beneath” (Report); and,

WHEREAS, Among other things, the Report contains findings regarding the performance of City agencies, including the SFMTA, related to the Project; the Report also contains recommendations for City agencies on delivering capital projects in the future; and,

WHEREAS, On July 23, 2021, the SFMTA, under authority delegated by the Planning Department, determined that the June 2021 Civil Grand Jury Report is not a “project” under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) pursuant to Title 14 of the California Code of Regulations Sections 15060(c) and 15378(b) ; and,

WHEREAS, A copy of the CEQA determination is on file with the Secretary to the SFMTA Board of Directors, and is incorporated herein by reference; and,

WHEREAS, The Report requests responses to the Report from the SFMTA and its Board of Directors within 60 days, or no later than August 30, 2021; and

WHEREAS, SFMTA Staff has prepared responses to the findings and recommendations in the Report; now, therefore, be it

RESOLVED, That the SFMTA Board of Directors approves the responses on behalf of the SFMTA and the Board of Directors to the findings and recommendations in the June 2021 Grand Jury Report regarding the Van Ness Corridor Transit Improvement Project, which responses are attached as Enclosure 3; and be it further

RESOLVED, That the SFMTA Board of Directors authorizes the Director to make non-material modifications necessary prior to submission.

I certify that the foregoing resolution was adopted by the San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency Board of Directors at its meeting of August 3, 2021.

Secretary to the Board of Directors
San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency

Enclosure 2

(Grand Jury Report)



Van Ness Avenue: What Lies Beneath

JUNE 2021

City and County of San Francisco

Civil Grand Jury | 2020–2021



About the Civil Grand Jury

The Civil Grand Jury is a government oversight panel of volunteers who serve for one year. It makes findings and recommendations resulting from its investigations.

Reports of the Civil Grand Jury do not identify individuals by name. Disclosure of information about individuals interviewed by the jury is prohibited.

California Penal Code, section 929.

2020–2021 Jurors

Ellie Schafer, *Foreperson*
Allen Cohn, *Foreperson Pro Tem*
Stephanie Jacques, *Recording Secretary*
Donna Hurowitz, *Corresponding Secretary*

Ron Boring
Geoffrey Brown
Mike Fitzgerald
JR Formanek
Nina Huebsch
Evelyn Hunt
Simone Manganelli
James Matthews
Dr. Janet Mohle-Boetani
Kenneth Moses
Judi Sanderlin
Adam J. Thaler
Nicholas Weininger
Bebo White
Thomas Yankowski

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Executive Summary

The Van Ness Corridor Transit Improvement Project (Van Ness Project) and the delays it has incurred illustrate organizational shortcomings the City and County of San Francisco (the City) faces in delivering major public works projects. In particular:

1. Planning and design processes failed to capture the scope of the project adequately.
2. Contracting processes failed to instill accountability.
3. Ongoing project management failed to remediate problems efficiently and effectively.

These shortcomings created opportunities for mistakes years before breaking ground and throughout the construction process, and many of them were foreseeable and avoidable. The City should take action to address these shortcomings to prevent similar failures in future projects.

Background


The Van Ness Avenue corridor serves as both a vital connector of San Francisco neighborhoods and a regional link for travel between Marin, San Francisco, and San Mateo Counties. Van Ness Avenue is one of the busiest north-south corridors in the City, spanning two miles from Lombard Street to Mission Street. In 2003, 75% of San Francisco voters approved Proposition K, a sales tax to provide rapid transit service on Van Ness Avenue.¹

In September 2013, the Board of Supervisors, acting as the San Francisco County Transportation Authority Commission, unanimously approved the Van Ness Bus Rapid Transit Project (BRT), the core of the Van Ness Project. The overall cost to revive this aging corridor is approximately \$346 million.

¹ Department of Elections, "November 4, 2003 Consolidated Municipal Election," *City and County of San Francisco*, <https://sfelections.sfgov.org/results-summary-nov-2003>

Figure 1 below illustrates the location of the project:

Figure 1. Location of Van Ness BRT



The stated goals of the project were to:

- Improve the level of service for existing transit passengers
- Establish an efficient north-south link in San Francisco's transit network
- Create an identity of the Van Ness corridor through landscaping and urban design that integrates transit infrastructure with adjacent land uses
- Develop standards for implementing Bus Rapid Transit Services citywide²

² San Francisco County Transportation Authority, *Van Ness BRT Feasibility Study*, Section 1.1. PDF file. https://www.sfcta.org/sites/default/files/2019-02/Van%20Ness%20BRTFeasibilityStudy_Dec_2006.pdf

Bus Rapid Transit is designed to have better capacity and reliability than a conventional bus system. The system includes roadways that are dedicated to buses and gives priority to buses at intersections where they interact with other traffic. Design features of the system are intended to reduce delays caused by passengers boarding or leaving buses or paying fares. It combines the capacity and speed of a rail transit system with the flexibility, lower cost, and simplicity of a bus system.

Upon breaking ground in 2016, the project was expected to be completed by the end of 2019. This timeline included a complete replacement and movement of underground utilities, but shortly after breaking ground, many issues with this replacement were discovered. As of the release date of this report, the expected completion date has been extended into 2022.

The Civil Grand Jury's interest in examining the Van Ness Project stemmed from the continued delay. This is not the first major transportation project in San Francisco to experience such a significant delay, and the Jury's investigation sought to identify any underlying deficiencies in the process that could be remedied for future projects.

Methodology

The Civil Grand Jury (the Jury) traced the history of the Van Ness Project from inception to current status, including a review of various plans, studies, environmental impact reports, and funding sources. The Jury held a series of interviews with City officials and employees from various departments. Non-City employees involved in the project in various capacities were invited to respond to inquiries as well.

The Jury also reviewed numerous public documents related to the project, including board meeting minutes, the City's Capital Plan, contracts and contract modifications, and various directives and memoranda of understanding. This included an examination of more detailed project documents provided by interviewees, such as utility drawings, maps, timelines, and specifications. Further guidance from various state, federal, and private sources of information, such as earlier Civil Grand Jury reports, as well as industry standards for construction, contracting, and underground work, and safety protocols for infrastructure projects were also reviewed.

All of these sources of information were used to validate and verify statements made during interviews to provide a detailed view of the history and timeline of the project. Facts that the Jury could corroborate from multiple sources were then used to determine the findings and recommendations included in this report.

For purposes of reviewing project costs, the Jury considered both the initial construction contract, originally valued at \$193 million, and the full project budget, originally estimated at \$309 million, which includes internal costs, allocation from budget contingencies, and other items. The full project budget is presented in [Appendix A](#).

Discussion

The Van Ness Project is a case study in how mistakes can compound through the course of a major project. For purposes of this investigation, the Jury reviewed the history of the project in three phases:

1. Project planning and design, between 2004 and 2014
2. Contracting and preconstruction, between 2014 and 2016
3. Construction, since 2016

The City missed multiple opportunities throughout the first two phases to identify and minimize the risks inherent in a project of this complexity and magnitude. These misses resulted in significant delays during the third phase.

Missed opportunities include the following:

- Project design—the impacts of key design decisions were not explored adequately
- Contracting—the contracting process did not value technical expertise sufficiently
- Preconstruction—the preconstruction deliverables were not established and evaluated appropriately

These missed opportunities impacted the construction phase adversely, to the point that the City was unable to manage the project effectively after ground was broken.

As a result of these missteps, the total cost of the project has increased from \$309 million (including \$28 million of contingency budgets) to a current estimate of \$346 million, an increase of 12% overall and 23% exclusive of contingencies. This cost increase includes both construction costs (additions to the primary contract) and ongoing costs incurred directly by the City as a result of the extended project timelines (e.g., dedicated personnel costs). The duration of construction has also increased from three years to nearly six years.

Project Planning and Design

San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency (SFMTA) has told the public repeatedly that aged underground utilities caused the project delays. While this is technically true, it fails to acknowledge that adequate assessment of the utilities during the planning and design phase of the project would have resulted in a more accurate project timeline and would have avoided setting unrealistic completion dates. Despite extensive study and analysis on the project as a whole, design choices for the Van Ness BRT were made without adequate knowledge of Van Ness Avenue's subsurface infrastructure.

Initial Feasibility and Project Design

The Van Ness Project was part of the 1995 Four Corridor Plan³ created by the San Francisco County Transportation Authority Commission, and Proposition K's specified expenditure plan included Bus Rapid Transit on Van Ness Avenue.⁴ After passage of Proposition K in 2003, the SFMTA began formal planning for the project.

While multiple City agencies participated in the Van Ness Project, SFMTA became the formal project owner. SFMTA completed their feasibility study in 2006 followed by a draft Environmental Impact Report (EIR)⁵ in 2011. This draft report identified three possible designs:⁶

1. Side-lane BRT with street parking
2. Center-lane BRT with right-side boarding and dual medians
3. Center-lane BRT with left-side boarding and a single median

Design options were circulated for public review and comment over a seven-week period in 2011. As part of the approval process for the Environmental Impact Report, the National Environmental Policy Act requires selection of a Locally Preferred Alternative, and the center lane right-side boarding design was selected. As a result of the public review and comment period, the chosen design was modified slightly from one of the draft design options.

Once the design selection was made, it was incorporated into the final Environmental Impact Report which was approved in 2013. This design choice would have significant implications for the project.

Impact of Center-Lane BRT Design

Construction was scheduled to begin in October 2016 with substantial completion by October 2019, but the choice of the center-lane BRT rendered the original project timeline infeasible before construction even began. Water and sewer lines were located in the center of Van Ness Avenue, and if they were left in place below the BRT lanes, future maintenance on these lines could not be performed without significant disruption to BRT service.

³ San Francisco County Transportation Authority, *The Four Corridor Plan*, PDF file. <https://ia800400.us.archive.org/21/items/fourcorridorplan95sanf/fourcorridorplan95sanf.pdf>

⁴ City and County of San Francisco, *Legal Text of Proposition K*, PDF file. <http://www.amlegal.com/pdffiles/sanfran/2003-11-04-PropK.pdf>

⁵ Environmental impact assessments ensure that considerations of possible environmental impacts of a proposed project are considered and mitigated. The report is a technical tool that identifies, predicts, and analyzes impact on the physical environment as well as social, cultural, and health impacts.


⁶ Both the National Environmental Policy Act and the California Environmental Quality Act require consideration of a range of reasonable alternatives, including a no-build alternative.

Future maintenance would be complicated because:

1. In order to perform repairs and maintenance on the water and sewer lines, technicians would have to dig through the newly-constructed BRT lanes, and this would take the BRT out of service.
2. The overhead contact system⁷ would need to be deenergized or removed temporarily due to Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) requirements for a 20-foot overhead clearance when working near a power line.⁸

The overhead contact system is illustrated in Figure 2 below. The Van Ness BRT buses will run on electrical power, and the lines supplying the power to the buses are located directly above the BRT lanes. With the side-lane BRT design, the electrical lines would also be on the side, and work on the original water and sewer lines under the center median could be performed without affecting the overhead lines.

Figure 2. Overhead Contact System in a Center-Lane BRT Design⁹



These two complications thrust the Water, Power, and Sewer divisions of the San Francisco Public Utilities Commission (SFPUC) into a larger role in the overall project. SFPUC's work plan at the time included maintenance of the water system, but there was no near-term plan for maintenance or replacement of the sewer lines.

⁷ The overhead lines and wires used to transmit electrical energy to buses.

⁸ Occupational Safety and Health Administration, *Laws and Regulations, Standard 1926.1408*, <https://www.osha.gov/laws-regs/regulations/standardnumber/1926/1926.1408>

⁹ San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency, *Construction Phases*, <https://www.sfmta.com/projects/van-ness-improvement-project>

Had the side-lane BRT design been selected, there would not have been an immediate need to move both the water and sewer lines. SFMTA determined, however, that the long-term goals of the Van Ness Project would be better achieved through the center-lane design, despite the need to move the existing water and sewer lines. Long-term benefits of the center-lane design include elimination of conflicts with right-turning vehicles and bicycles, exclusive signaling for transit vehicles, and improvement of pedestrian crossings through breaking up the wide street. Additionally, improved access to underground utilities located under the side lanes will make SFPUC repairs and maintenance less disruptive to traffic in the future. So while the side-lane BRT would have prevented the subsequent issues with the underground infrastructure, SFMTA determined that it would have reduced the benefits of the BRT considerably.

Ultimately, SFMTA's selection of the center-lane design required relocation of the water and sewer infrastructure, and this complication was not addressed adequately during the planning process. While the 2006 feasibility study mentioned the center location of the sewer lines,¹⁰ it did not acknowledge that the sewer lines would need to be moved to allow for future repairs and maintenance.

Another oversight in the planning and design process was that the status of the underground infrastructure was largely unknown. The critical resource for underground work is a utility map which shows the location and identification of pipes, lines, and cables buried below the ground. Determining the accuracy of the utility map is a key component in planning a large-scale construction project like Van Ness. There are multiple ways to identify what is underground, such as potholing, ground-penetrating radar, and simply walking along the street and noting critical indicators, such as manhole covers. This assessment did not occur during the planning phase of the project, and much of it was not even done until after construction actually started.

Methods for Derisking the Underground Work

Derisking is the process of making a project more predictable by reducing the possibility that something can go wrong. In a construction project of this complexity and magnitude, derisking should begin as early in the process as possible. In regard to the underground work in particular, there are three methods of derisking that could have been performed during planning and design. These include:

1. Potholing
2. Ground-penetrating radar
3. Surface inspection

¹⁰ San Francisco County Transportation Authority, *Van Ness BRT Feasibility Study*, Section 2.4.1. PDF file. https://www.sfcta.org/sites/default/files/2019-02/Van%20Ness%20BRTFeasibilityStudy_Dec_2006.pdf

Potholing is the practice of digging a series of test holes to expose underground utilities in order to ascertain their horizontal and vertical locations. This practice is generally viewed as an essential phase of underground construction and is a critical step in assessing the accuracy of utility maps. It is most useful when performed during the planning and design phases of a construction project. SFPUC requested exploratory potholing well in advance of construction, a standard practice on their own projects, but it did not occur during the planning phase for the Van Ness Project.

Ground-penetrating radar is a less-invasive means of assessing the accuracy of utility maps. This method uses radar pulses to image the subsurface and is particularly useful in identifying underground utilities. While ground-penetrating radar was done eventually, it was well after construction started and only after it became evident that the utility maps were inaccurate.

Surface inspection is a third method for determining accuracy of the utility map. This includes walking up and down the road and comparing the utility indicators, such as manhole covers or removable plates, to the map. For example, a significant finding during construction was a large Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E) vault located between Vallejo Street and Pacific Avenue. This vault was not identified on the City's utility map. However, this could have been identified as an inaccuracy on the map by walking along the street, seeing a manhole cover, and noting that it was not on the map.

Extensive assessment of the utility map during the planning process, using any method, would have yielded a more accurate project plan.

Contracting and Preconstruction

In recent years, the Construction Manager/General Contractor (CMGC) model has gained traction as an approach to manage increasingly complex public-sector construction projects. Multiple modes of transportation have entered roadways, cities have become more densely populated, infrastructure has aged, and regulations have become more stringent. The CMGC engagement model is intended to drive innovation, improve design quality, control costs, and optimize construction schedules by introducing expert input at all stages of the project while also providing continuity in the form of a single contractor relationship.

The CMGC process includes two phases:

1. Design and preconstruction
2. Construction

During the design and preconstruction phase, the contractor partners with the project owner to identify risks, refine the project design and schedule, and provide cost projections. Once the design and preconstruction phase is complete, the contractor and project owner negotiate a price for the construction contract, and the construction phase begins, with the same contractor typically serving as the contractor during the construction period.

The City began using the CMGC model in 2007, specifically with building projects undertaken by San Francisco Public Works, including the Academy of Sciences and the rebuild of San Francisco General Hospital. In fact, the 2014–15 Civil Grand Jury praised the City’s use of the CMGC model to deliver major construction projects on time and within projected budgets.¹¹ Before the Van Ness Project, however, a CMGC contract had not been used on a transportation infrastructure project or on any project that involved multiple City agencies.

SFMTA chose the CMGC model for the Van Ness Project even though they had not used it before, and their inexperience with this type of contract led to the potential benefits (stemming from the close relationship between the City and contractor) being minimized, and the potential sticking points (stemming from a reliance on flexibility and good faith as opposed to exacting specifications) being exacerbated.

In particular, industry best practices recommend engaging with the contractor as early as possible in the design process, and preferably when the design is no more than 30% complete. In the case of the Van Ness Project, City engineers continued design work while the bidding process for the CMGC contractor was taking place, and the design was closer to 70% complete by the time the preconstruction contract was awarded. As a result, the selected contractor had much less input into the project design than the CMGC approach intended, thereby minimizing the advantages of this contract model.

Bidding and Contract Selection

A CMGC contract for design and preconstruction is awarded typically on either a qualifications-based selection process or a best-value selection process. The industry standard is the qualifications-based process, where construction cost is not a criterion for contract selection.¹² For the Van Ness Project, however, SFMTA used the best-value selection process. The selection rubric provided a total of 180 possible points, where 120 were allocated to technical qualifications and 60 were allocated to price.¹³ This allocation was, in fact, enough to result in the selection of the bid that was not the most technically qualified.

SFMTA received preconstruction bids from two teams of contractors. Each team included the general contractor as well as subcontractors that would be responsible for the largest components of the project. Most notably, these teams included the subcontractors slated to perform the underground utility work. Walsh Construction (Walsh), the eventual winner of the preconstruction bid, included Synergy Project Management (Synergy) as their subcontractor for the underground work.


¹¹ City and County of San Francisco Civil Grand Jury, *San Francisco’s City Construction Program: It Needs Work*. PDF file. https://civilgrandjury.sfgov.org/2014_2015/14-15_CGJ_Report_SF_Construction_Program_It_Needs_Work_7_16_15.pdf

¹² Associated General Contractors of America and the National Association of State Facilities Administrators, *CM/GC Guidelines for Public Owners*. PDF file. https://www.agc.org/sites/default/files/Files/Programs%20%26%20Industry%20Relations/CM_GC_Guidelines.pdf

¹³ The cost bid included the contractor’s price for the preconstruction period as well as their fixed fee for the construction period.

Walsh scored lower in technical qualifications but submitted the lower bid in terms of cost (\$10.4 million in fixed fees versus \$18.5 million). This \$8.1 million difference in the preconstruction cost bid was just enough to result in Walsh earning the overall higher score on SFMTA's rubric. Walsh was therefore awarded the preconstruction contract and ultimately the entire construction contract, valued initially at \$193 million. A summary of the scoring is presented in Figure 3 below, and the full scoring is presented in [Appendix B](#).

Figure 3. Preconstruction Bid Scoring



SFMTA's use of the best-value selection process resulted in selecting a contractor who was, in SFMTA's own evaluation, less technically qualified, based on a bid that comprised less than 5% of the construction contract value and around 3% of the total project cost. Ironically, even this "best-value" point allocation was only allowed through a special legislative allowance approved by the Board of Supervisors.¹⁴ Outside of the Van Ness Project, the City's Administrative Code at the time required cost to be weighted at 65% or greater of the total scoring.¹⁵ While this has since been amended to allow cost considerations to be weighted as low as 40%, this requirement is still not in line with industry best practice.

¹⁴ City and County of San Francisco, *Ordinance 255-14*, <https://sfbos.org/ftp/uploadedfiles/bdsupvrs/ordinances14/o0255-14.pdf>

¹⁵ City and County of San Francisco, *Administrative Code Section 6.68*, https://codelibrary.amlegal.com/codes/san_francisco/latest/sf_admin/0-0-0-2999#JD_6.68

Preconstruction Processes and Deliverables

The expected outcome of the preconstruction phase was a defined set of deliverables consisting of various design and timeline-projection artifacts as well as cost estimates for the actual construction work. These deliverables did not, however, include significant on-the-ground derisking or validation as is expected in the industry.¹⁶ Given the inherent risk associated with the underground work, based primarily on the complexity of the Van Ness corridor and the age of the utilities, failure to include an accurate assessment of the underground infrastructure during the preconstruction phase was another missed opportunity for the City.

The possibility of undisclosed utilities was recognized during preconstruction via a risk register, a tool used to identify potential risks, rank them, and determine mitigation strategies. But undisclosed utilities were identified as only a moderate risk despite the relative age and complexity of the Van Ness corridor. The City's only accompanying mitigation strategy was the allocation of additional contingency dollars.¹⁷ This was the last chance to introduce potholing or an equivalent method that could have uncovered the reality of the underground utility situation, but the cited mitigation strategy did not include any actual derisking work.

In fact, discrepancies of all magnitudes existed between the utility maps and the actual underground infrastructure, and these were not discovered until construction began.

Walsh did complete the deliverables as they were defined. This included production of the construction artifacts, a construction plan, and successful community outreach and permit management. In particular, their work in dealing with the complexities of CalTrans policies was extremely noteworthy.¹⁸ These are all valuable outputs of the CMGC model. Unfortunately, these deliverables were insufficient to prepare for the work that was ahead. A summary of all preconstruction deliverables is provided in [Appendix C](#).

Walsh's performance during the preconstruction phase was deemed sufficiently satisfactory to proceed with the full construction contract. While the City could have put the construction work out for a separate bid, it chose not to, as is customary with the CMGC model. After negotiations, the City approved a modification to the preconstruction contract adding \$193 million to its value and formally naming Walsh as the general contractor.¹⁹

¹⁶ American Society of Civil Engineers, *Standard Guideline for the Collection and Depiction of Existing Subsurface Utility Data*. PDF file. <http://www.dot.ga.gov/PartnerSmart/utilities/Documents/ASCE%2038-02.pdf>

¹⁷ On a scale of zero to five, with zero being no risk and five being the highest risk, undisclosed utilities were assigned the following: probability of occurring = 3, impact to cost = 2, and impact to schedule = 2.

¹⁸ A portion of Van Ness Avenue is part of US Route 101, and thus under the jurisdiction of CalTrans which must approve all work conducted on that section of the corridor.

¹⁹ San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency, *Resolution No. 180821-115*. PDF file. <https://www.sfmta.com/sites/default/files/agendaitems/2016/8-16-16%20Item%2011%20Contract%20Amendment%20-%20Van%20Ness%20Project.pdf>

Construction Contract

An additional complication arose from the way that costs were shared between City departments, and this resulted in a significant delay to the project. Although SFPUC is the owner of the underground utilities, it was not involved sufficiently in the decisions made during the contracting phases of the project. SFMTA, as the project owner, entered into the construction contract on behalf of itself and SFPUC.

After the contract was signed, SFMTA entered into a cost-sharing arrangement with SFPUC. Under the terms of the arrangement, SFPUC became responsible for an estimated \$54 million of the project costs related to streetlight, water, and sewer replacement.²⁰ Because of this arrangement, SFPUC assumed a more prominent interest in directing how these funds would be spent.

As noted previously, Walsh's chosen subcontractor for the underground work was Synergy, and this became a point of contention. SFPUC engineers had estimated the cost of the underground work at \$16 million. Synergy's bid, however, was for \$20 million, and the City was unable to settle on a mutually acceptable price between SFPUC and Walsh for its chosen subcontractor. Walsh decided to remove Synergy from the project and rebid the work rather than agree to perform this work for \$16 million. With construction ready to proceed, Walsh was now without a subcontractor to perform this core work causing an immediate delay in the project.

Unfortunately, this decision backfired. When the work was rebid, only one subcontractor submitted a bid for the entirety of the underground work, and this bid was much higher than Synergy's \$20 million bid. Left without any other choice, Walsh awarded the work to Ranger at a cost of \$30 million.²¹ This \$10 million increase decimated Walsh's expected profit on the contract and set the stage for a series of disputes between Walsh and the City that took years of disagreement, haggling, mediation, and legal action to resolve.

The delay in the start of construction while Walsh searched for a new subcontractor was significant. Originally, the construction work on underground utilities was projected to begin in February 2017, but it actually started in October 2017 due to this complication. Even more devastating was the damage to the relationship between Walsh and the City, which ran counter to the partnership the CMGC model intended to create.

²⁰ City and County of San Francisco Public Utilities Commission, *Resolution 17-0234*. PDF file. <https://sfpuc.sharefile.com/share/view/s0a2c9058d6941e7a>

²¹ Synergy became ineligible to rebid due to its inability to obtain sufficient bonding. Walsh covered the bonding in the initial bid but not in the rebid.

Construction

The result of the missteps in the planning, design, contracting, and preconstruction phases became evident once construction began. Inadequate management of the project during the construction phase further exacerbated these mounting issues, and avoidable problems continued to plague the project. The issues became more and more difficult to resolve as a result of the deteriorating relationship between Walsh and the City.

Construction Delays at the Outset

As discussed previously, the City failed to assess the underground infrastructure sufficiently, so that as soon as Walsh broke ground, it became evident that some of the utility maps were inaccurate. Once Walsh realized they could not rely on the utility maps, they approached the City with a contract modification to perform potholing.

This became another significant point of contention, with the City arguing that potholing was required per the contract and Walsh arguing that the needed potholing was much more substantial than what was specified in the contract. The disagreement ultimately came down to the technical specifications in the contract which used the terms “exploratory” and “incidental” interchangeably.

This was resolved eventually through professional mediation and a contract modification, and the time taken to resolve this dispute delayed the project further.

Differing site conditions were found on virtually every block of the project, to the point that almost no work could be performed until the potholing disagreement was resolved. Walsh proceeded with digging on each block in hopes of finding a zone where construction could proceed. As a result, multiple blocks were torn up and the flow of traffic disrupted, but no tangible progress was being made. This did not go unnoticed by the public, most notably residents and businesses along the corridor.

As a stop-gap measure while mediation and negotiations were taking place, Walsh used ground-penetrating radar to assist in identifying the location of the underground utilities. While helpful, this was not an adequate substitute for advance potholing because the ground-penetrating radar was not sophisticated enough to distinguish between utility lines and densely-packed soil.

Project Management

It is possible that the impact of the failures to foresee problems could have been mitigated with effective and flexible project management once the problems actually arose. Unfortunately, this did not happen. As a result of the now-contentious relationship between Walsh and the City and a lack of in-the-field City presence during early phases of construction, the City had difficulties managing shifting conditions within the parameters of the CMGC contract.

After the subcontractor re-bidding episode and resulting delays, Walsh had seen its profit margin erased almost entirely by the time the project started and, therefore, was unwilling to absorb further risk. When practical issues came up—for instance, when poorly-documented utility lines were discovered—the contractor’s incentive was to pause work while it pursued contract modifications to ensure compensation for the unplanned work. In turn, the City generally allowed this to happen by focusing on adjudicating and upholding the letter of the contract rather than prioritizing expeditious or creative workarounds.

Instead of the productive partnership with aligned incentives promised by a CMGC contract model, the City and Walsh had lost trust in each other, and progress on the actual task at hand was the casualty of their distraction. Compounding these problems, Walsh’s project management team saw significant turnover in the early phases of the project, with three different project managers at the helm between preconstruction and mid-2019. Between that churn and the City not having a clear point person in the field, there was no opportunity for personal trust to form at the individual level.

As arguments over specific technical complications accumulated, Walsh eventually requested creation of a formal Dispute Resolution Board. Ongoing disagreements were eventually resolved through the dispute resolution process, and only after both Walsh and the City agreed to additional in-the-field support did construction begin proceeding at a reasonable pace.

An additional failure in project management arose over the provision of pedestrian monitors. Similar to the disagreement over potholing, the dispute over pedestrian monitors stemmed from ambiguous language in the contract. The contract failed to make the appropriate distinction between traffic flaggers and pedestrian monitors. One is focused on controlling the flow of vehicles, and the other is focused on the safety of foot traffic. As a result, Walsh was required to provide traffic flaggers per the contract but not pedestrian monitors.


During the negotiation of the construction contract, the City agreed to provide the pedestrian monitors but then failed to do so. When the need for them became apparent for safety reasons, Walsh provided the monitors and then sought a contract modification to be paid for them. This is yet another disagreement that took years to resolve, and while it seems relatively minor in relation to the entire project, it is another example of a disagreement that could not be resolved in a timely manner.

Details of the construction contract and subsequent modifications are presented in [Appendix D](#).

Final Project Timeline

Both the original timeline and the current projected timeline for the Van Ness Project are presented in Figure 4 below, and the full timeline is presented in [Appendix E](#).

Figure 4. Abridged Timeline of the Van Ness Improvement Project



Conclusion

Given the importance and prominent visibility of the corridor, the Van Ness Project has been watched closely by the public from its beginning. The ongoing delay in project completion and the multiple reported completion dates have damaged the public's confidence in SFMTA to keep its promises. It is understandable that a project of this magnitude and complexity would take many years to plan and construct. But the missteps during the planning and preconstruction phases that eventually impacted construction adversely affected users of the roadway as well as residents and businesses along the corridor.

The Jury identified multiple missed opportunities to predict the cost and duration of the project accurately. Mistakes that happened early in the planning and design phases were compounded as the project progressed. While it is true that the unexpected condition of the underground infrastructure is the primary cause of the delay, more work could have been done to anticipate what actually lay beneath the surface, and much of the delay could have been avoided.

Although it is too late to correct these deficiencies on the Van Ness Project, the City should take steps to ensure the same mistakes do not occur in the future. The Jury's findings and recommendations are listed below.

Findings

- F1.** The delays in completion of the Van Ness BRT Project were caused primarily by avoidable setbacks in replacement of the water and sewer infrastructure.
- F2.** The potential impact of utility replacement on the cost and duration of the overall project was given insufficient consideration in the initial planning process.
- F3.** The potential impact of utility replacement was known to City engineers to be a major risk but was only considered a moderate risk and assigned no mitigation strategy in the official risk register.
- F4.** Project timelines could not be estimated accurately because documents did not reflect the extent and location of underground utilities accurately.
- F5.** The evaluation rubric for preconstruction contract bids weighted cost too heavily, as compared to technical expertise, even after project-specific legislation allowed for a lower weight to be assigned to cost.
- F6.** Practical work during preconstruction that could have derisked the subsequent construction phase of the project was insufficient.
- F7.** Review of preconstruction deliverables did not sufficiently measure the contractor's preparedness for construction, which resulted in both inaccurate cost estimates and timelines.
- F8.** The effectiveness of the CMGC contract was greatly reduced because the general contractor was brought into the design process too late.
- F9.** Underspecification in technical requirements led to additional costs for work that could have been predicted and included in the original contract.
- F10.** Contention over underspecified or unclear contract terms and technical requirements led to a deterioration in the relationship between the City and Walsh, the general contractor.
- F11.** The removal of Synergy, the underground subcontractor, from the project, partially as a result of poor cost estimates, contributed to the deterioration of the relationship between Walsh, the general contractor, and the City.
- F12.** The contentious relationship between Walsh, the general contractor, and the City made it difficult to resolve problems as they arose, despite close collaboration being one of the potential advantages of the CMGC contract.
- F13.** Lack of an in-the-field point of contact between Walsh and the City during early stages of construction led to delays and increased costs on the project.

- F14.** Confusion related to the contractual requirements for pedestrian monitoring contributed to the deterioration of the relationship between Walsh, the general contractor, and the City.

Recommendations

- R1.** By June 2022, the City should adopt a policy that all capital project feasibility plans include an itemized assessment of risks to project timelines and costs, which must be accompanied with specific procedures that will be undertaken to mitigate those risks early in the project.
- R2.** By June 2022, the City should adopt a policy that all capital project sponsors publish, before proceeding to the construction phase, an itemized assessment of derisking activities actually performed.
- R3.** By June 2022, the Board of Supervisors and SFPUC should review and update policies and regulations to ensure that detailed as-built documentation of both private and public utilities is filed after all underground projects (whether undertaken by SFPUC, another City agency, or a private enterprise), with sufficient resolution and precision to allow accurate design of any future work.
- R4.** The Board of Supervisors should direct all City departments to adopt a policy that all projects that involve underground work in the City's main corridors include, as part of the design process, the use of exploratory potholing, or another equivalent industry best-practice to identify unknown underground obstructions adhering to [CI/ASCE 38-02](#) ("Standard Guideline for the Collection and Depiction of Existing Subsurface Utility Data") Quality Level A. This policy should take effect for all contracts signed after January 1, 2022, and the work should be required to be performed before final construction terms or prices are agreed to.
- R5.** By June 2022, and before entering into future CMGC relationships, the Board of Supervisors should direct all City departments to adopt, publish, and enforce in all future contracts industry-standard best practices for management of CMGC projects.
- R6.** The adopted CMGC management policy should specifically include the industry best practice of awarding the contract before project design continues past 30% completion.

- R7.** By June 2022, the Board of Supervisors should amend Section 6.68 of the Administrative Code to remove the mandatory cost criterion in awarding CMGC contracts.
- R8.** SFMTA should establish a policy for review of technical quality of preconstruction and design deliverables, to be used in all CMGC or design contracts signed after January 2022, including in-the-field validation of key assumptions of site conditions by City engineers.
- R9.** Beginning January 1, 2022, SFMTA should assign to every CMGC project a dedicated in-the-field contractor liaison to facilitate collaborative problem resolution, and sufficient support staff to monitor actual progress and site conditions.
- R10.** By June 2022, the City should adopt a policy that any public communication about a planned or in-progress capital project that includes disruption of public services or right-of-way should include itemized assessments of risk to projected costs and duration.
- R11.** Beginning immediately, and in all future capital or maintenance projects that require pedestrian monitors, the City should ensure that associated costs are either specifically included in the primary construction contract, or explicitly planned for and funded by the City, before construction begins.

Request for Responses

Pursuant to Penal Code sections 933 and 933.05, the Civil Grand Jury requests responses as follows:

From these City agencies within 60 days:

- From the Office of the Mayor:
 - Findings 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14
 - Recommendations 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11
- From the General Manager of San Francisco Public Utilities Commission:
 - Findings 1,2,3,4,6,8,9,11
 - Recommendations 1,2,3,4,5
- From the San Francisco Public Utilities Commission:
 - Findings 1,2,3,4,6,8,9,11
 - Recommendations 1,2,3,4,5
- From the San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency:
 - Findings 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14
 - Recommendations 1,2,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11
- From the Office of the SFMTA Board of Directors:
 - Findings 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14
 - Recommendations 1,2,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11

From the following governing body within 90 days:

- From the Board of Supervisors:
 - Findings 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14
 - Recommendations 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11

Invited Responses

The Civil Grand Jury invites responses from the below City agency as follows:

- From San Francisco Public Works:
 - Findings 1,2,3,5,6,8
 - Recommendations 1,2,4,5,6,7

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Appendix A

Total Project Budget (At Beginning of Construction)

Description	Amount
Environmental phase	\$6,000,000
Civil engineering phase	8,900,000
Design phase	17,800,000
Construction phase:	
Construction contract	193,000,000
Contingency for design errors and omissions	1,200,000
Shared contingency	16,100,000
SFMTA-specific contingencies	10,500,000
Owner-furnished during construction	10,600,000
Owner soft costs during construction:	
SFMTA/SFPW project/construction management	21,100,000
SFMTA/SFPW engineering support	7,100,000
SFMTA operations	400,000
SFMTA outreach	1,000,000
Consultant services	1,500,000
Bus substitution	8,000,000
Startup and testing	2,200,000
Buses	4,000,000
Total project budget ²²	\$309,400,000

²² This was the working budget until the contingency funds were exhausted. As of the release date of this report, the expected total project budget has increased to \$345,900,000. This is largely the result of additional owner soft costs incurred from the project delay.

Appendix B

Preconstruction Bid Scoring

Proposer	Written Proposal	Oral Presentation	Price	Total
Available Points	90	30	60	180
Walsh Construction	69.53	17.17	60	146.70
Van Ness Corridor Constructors	82.27	27	33.6	142.87
Per the Request for Proposals, SFMTA assigned a score of 60 to the lowest proposed price. Total points for the other proposer were calculated by dividing the higher price into the lowest price in order to determine a percentage. That percentage was then multiplied by 60 in order to arrive at the points awarded for that higher price.				

Appendix C

Preconstruction Deliverables

Task Order Number	Task	Description
5	Supplemental Archeological Mitigation Plan	Prepare a Supplemental Archeological Mitigation Plan acceptable to the California State Historic Preservation Office.
7	Value Engineering Report	Provide, and submit a written report of value engineering and constructability recommendations based on the 65% Design drawings in Appendix P.1 [of the preconstruction contract] and the 95% final design drawings.
8	Construction Plan	Submit a preliminary and a final Construction Plan to SFMTA. The preliminary plan will be reviewed by all interested parties and used to establish the final plan. In each plan, the CM/GC shall address proposed construction phasing; staging; sequencing of work; duration of work within work zones; field office needs; parking requirements during construction; construction equipment storage and use of public roadways; coordination of work with the public, including utility disruptions; protection of private and public properties; dirt/debris mitigation; storm water drainage management; temporary facilities; construction zone pedestrian and vehicular traffic management, including signage; noise and vibration control; work hours, including number of shifts and weekend work; temporary road closures or detours; emergency vehicle provisions; maintaining access to all properties; public and worker safety protections; construction restrictions during special events; and security and maintenance of construction work zones. The final plan will be used as a basis for establishment of the Guaranteed Maximum Price (GMP) and the management of the construction following Notice to Proceed (NTP)
9	Construction Recycling Plan	Submit a report in compliance with San Francisco's construction recycling ordinance, identifying materials that may be cost-effectively recycled during construction, including an estimate of potential cost increases or decreases from the baseline estimate (Recycling Plan).
11	Contracting Plan (SBE)	Work with SFMTA to finalize a Contracting Plan that maximizes Small Business Enterprise (SBE) opportunities, in accordance with the SBE program identified in Appendix B [of the preconstruction contract]. Prepare for implementation of the SBE Trucking Set-Aside program. Include a proposed management plan to oversee SBE program implementation.
12	Long-Lead Items	Identify any long-lead items immediately after completion of 100% final design so that the milestone schedule can be met.
13	Contracting Plan (Construction)	Work with SFMTA to finalize and submit a Contracting Plan for accomplishment of all construction, including systems work. Recommend packaging of the work to facilitate bidding and award of trade contracts. The Contracting Plan shall at a minimum present the number of packages, a description of the scope of work for each package, the sequence and schedule for procurement, the Engineer's Estimate for each trade work package, and an outreach plan. With respect to work that the CM/GC and Core Subcontractors will be performing, explain how competitive pricing will be accomplished.

Appendix C (continued)

Preconstruction Deliverables

Task Order Number	Task	Description
14	CPM Schedule	Prepare, submit, and maintain for SFMTA approval a detailed, baseline, cost-loaded Critical Path Method (CPM) schedule using Primavera 6 that can be integrated into the SFMTA's Capital Projects Control System. The schedule will be used for schedule management during design and construction, and progress payments during construction.
16	Cost Estimate	Prepare and submit to SFMTA construction cost estimates of the 65% and 95% final design and construction documents. If SFMTA's preliminary construction cost estimate is exceeded, identify feasible cost-reducing options, including projected cost savings offset with any additional design costs, to bring construction costs within SFMTA's budget.
17	Safety Plan	Prepare and submit for SFMTA approval a public and worker safety plan (Safety Plan), in cooperation with and subject to approval by SFMTA's Safety Division, for use during construction.
18	QA/QC Plan	Prepare and submit for SFMTA approval a Project-specific Quality Assurance Process/Quality Control Plan, in compliance with SFMTA's QA/QC program, for use during construction, as explained in the Technical Specifications.
19	HazMat Plan	Prepare and submit for SFMTA approval a plan to handle both anticipated and unanticipated hazardous materials that may be encountered during construction (HazMat Plan).
20	Workforce Development Plan	Work with SFMTA to finalize a Workforce Development Plan in accordance with SFMTA's workforce training and hiring program requirements, including a construction management trainee plan.
21	Stormwater Plan	Prepare and submit a plan to manage stormwater runoff during construction in accordance with the requirements of all applicable federal, state and local governing agencies, including Caltrans and the City's PUC (Stormwater Plan).
22	Safety Certification Plan	Work with SFMTA as requested to prepare a Safety Certification Plan for use during and for closeout of construction.
23	Risk Management Plan	Work with SFMTA to prepare and submit a Risk Management Plan, including risk identification, allocation and mitigation. This first draft of the Plan shall be based on 65% drawings and the final draft shall be based on 95% drawings. Review site conditions, site surveys, and soils reports. Advise the SFMTA as to anticipated site challenges (other than those that would properly be addressed through CM/GC means and methods) and recommended mitigation measures.

Appendix D

Contract and Contract Modifications

Contract Modification Number	Date Approved	Description	Dollar Amount	Additional Time
Original Contract		Preconstruction services	\$800,000	
1	August 16, 2016	Construction services	\$193,027,555	5 years
2	August 21, 2018	Changes to Overhead Contact System and trolley/light pole foundations	\$4,463,161	0
3	July 5, 2018	Creation of Dispute Resolution Board (DRB)	\$0	0
4	September 28, 2018	Revision to plan specifications for sewer, water, landscaping, traction power, streetlights, and roadway	\$3,376,341	0
5	October 16, 2018	Traffic signal modifications	\$2,606,044	0
6	April 13, 2019	Extra field work for various items, specification changes to sewer system, and amendment of DRB process	\$4,013,224	0
7	July 16, 2019	Resolution of claims related to delays resulting from water and sewer work	\$4,819,650	279 days
8	August 20, 2019	Provision for potholing	\$1,709,202	0
9	February 18, 2020	Design changes to sidewalk gradings and catch basins	\$633,003	0
10	May 19, 2020	Design changes to sewer, water, traction power, sidewalk, and scheduling services	\$2,187,655	0
11	July 24, 2020	Allowance for Safe Work Practices due to COVID-19	\$282,000	0
12	December 15, 2020	Provision for pedestrian monitors	\$2,589,381	0
		Current contract cost with modifications	\$220,507,216	

Appendix E

Project Timeline

Date	Description
November 2003	Proposition K is passed at the ballot
December 2006	Feasibility Study on Van Ness BRT completed
October 2011	Draft EIR released
May 2012	MTA Board officially chooses preferred design
September 2013	Final EIR approved
October 2014	MTA Board approves using CMGC contract model
July 2015	Walsh awarded preconstruction CMGC contract
August 2016	Walsh awarded construction contract modification
October 2016	Official “Notice to Proceed” given for construction
December 2016	Construction actually begins
February 2017	Construction to begin on underground utilities (original projection) ²³
October 2017	Construction actually begins on underground utilities
November 2018	Underground utility construction to finish (original projection)
October 2019	Substantial completion of construction (original projection)
Late 2019	Start of passenger service (original projection)
February 2021	Underground utility construction actually finishes
January 2022	Substantial completion of construction (current projection)
Early 2022	Start of passenger service (current projection)

²³ Highlighted cells represent projections made at the time construction began.

Enclosure 3

(Responses to Grand Jury Report)

2020-21 CIVIL GRAND JURY FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND RESPONSES TO FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Report Title [Publication Date]	F#	Finding	Respondent Assigned by CGJ [Response Due Date]	Finding Response (Agree/ Disagree)	Finding Response Text
Van Ness Avenue : What Lies Beneath [June 28, 2021]	F1	The delays in completion of the Van Ness BRT Project were caused primarily by avoidable setbacks in replacement of the water and sewer infrastructure.	Director, San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency [August 27, 2021]	Disagree partially	Many of the initial delays on the Project occurred during construction of the underground phase of the Project; however, these delays were both avoidable and unavoidable. The City and the contractor often share responsibility for delays, and some of the delays were due to third parties. Understanding the delay on this project involves looking at the contractor's initial claim for 279 days of delay and its pending claim for 344 delay days. As to the initial claim for 279 days, the parties agreed that 135 were compensable (City's responsibility) and 144 were noncompensable (not the City's sole responsibility). In other words, the contractor acknowledged that it shared responsibility for more than half of the delay days. As to the pending claim for 344 days, the contractor failed to provide the required scheduling analysis; thus, the City has been required to undertake its own analysis of the delay. This analysis is currently underway.
Van Ness Avenue : What Lies Beneath [June 28, 2021]	F2	The potential impact of utility replacement on the cost and duration of the overall project was given insufficient consideration in the initial planning process.	Director, San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency [August 27, 2021]	Disagree partially	The potential impacts of utility replacement on the cost and duration of the project were considered in pre-construction. During the design phase, the City performed potholing and required PG&E to relocate gas mains and an electrical ductbank. Also, the City included a standard requirement in the Specifications that the Contractor perform significant amounts of potholing 30 days in advance of any installation. In addition, the contract included specific allowances to cover additional or unforeseen costs related to utility installation.

Report Title [Publication Date]	F#	Finding	Respondent Assigned by CGJ [Response Due Date]	Finding Response (Agree/ Disagree)	Finding Response Text
Van Ness Avenue : What Lies Beneath [June 28, 2021]	F3	The potential impact of utility replacement was known to City engineers to be a major risk, but was only considered a moderate risk and assigned no effective mitigation in the official risk register.	Director, San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency [August 27, 2021]	Disagree partially	The Contractor, City Staff, and an independent consultant cooperated in preparing the risk register and because of the mitigation measures being taken this was classified as a moderate risk. Several mitigation measures were included in the Specifications, such as requiring potholing 30 days in advance of the work, and providing the contractor with copies of deactivated utility drawings as reference documents. The Contractor failed to perform the required potholing in a timely fashion, at times attempting to dig potholes within hours of trenching to install utilities. Contractor's inability to properly anticipate/manage/mitigate utility issues during construction was the primary contributor to added contract costs and duration.
Van Ness Avenue : What Lies Beneath [June 28, 2021]	F4	Project timelines could not be estimated accurately because documents did not reflect the extent and location of underground utilities accurately.	Director, San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency [August 27, 2021]	Disagree partially	The project timeline prepared during pre-construction was a product of City staff, Contractor, and an independent consulting team based on the best information available. As it turned out, some third party, utilities such as PG&E, provided inaccurate or incomplete information on existing utilities. The Contractor did not take the lead in field investigation and coordination with third party utilities, although they were contractually obligated to do so as a CM/GC. The Contractor failed to perform the required potholing in a timely fashion, at times attempting to dig potholes within hours of trenching to install utilities. Contractor's inability to properly anticipate/manage/mitigate utility issues during construction was the primary contributor to added contract costs and duration. Contractor's initial construction sequencing plan was also unrealistic. All these contributed to an inaccurate project timeline.

2020-21 CIVIL GRAND JURY FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND RESPONSES TO FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Report Title [Publication Date]	F#	Finding	Respondent Assigned by CGJ [Response Due Date]	Finding Response (Agree/ Disagree)	Finding Response Text
Van Ness Avenue : What Lies Beneath [June 28, 2021]	F5	The evaluation rubric for preconstruction contract bids weighted cost too heavily, as compared to technical expertise, even after project-specific legislation allowed for a lower weight to be assigned to cost.	Director, San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency [August 27, 2021]	Agree	Such contracts should be best value. It appears as if the contractor low bid the pre-construction phase purposely in order to be awarded the contract.
Van Ness Avenue : What Lies Beneath [June 28, 2021]	F6	Practical work during preconstruction that could have derisked the subsequent construction phase of the project was insufficient.	Director, San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency [August 27, 2021]	Disagree partially	The majority of the utility conflicts that resulted in additional contract time were at intersections. Potholing within intersections typically requires the intersection to be closed in order to provide a safe barrier for the workers from traffic. Given that Van Ness Avenue is a State highway, this would have been extremely difficult to occur. Typically, this level of potholing is reserved for the construction phase when traffic can be effectively closed/diverted. Ground-penetrating radar (GPR) during the design phase had several issues with accuracy and reliability of the data. Recent improvements in GPR provide for a more reliable tool for future projects.
Van Ness Avenue : What Lies Beneath [June 28, 2021]	F7	Review of preconstruction deliverables did not sufficiently measure the contractor's preparedness for construction, which resulted in both inaccurate cost estimates and timelines.	Director, San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency [August 27, 2021]	Disagree partially	It is correct that the contractor may not have adequately prepared itself for construction during the year-long preconstruction period. For example, a careful review of the Storm Water Pollution Prevention Plan (SWPPP) and the construction sequencing plan for sewer work would have shown that the contractor was not prepared to begin work. The timeline for underground work provided by the contractor's subcontractor during preconstruction did not align with the timeline provided by the subcontractor who eventually performed the work.

Report Title [Publication Date]	F#	Finding	Respondent Assigned by CGJ [Response Due Date]	Finding Response (Agree/ Disagree)	Finding Response Text
Van Ness Avenue : What Lies Beneath [June 28, 2021]	F8	The effectiveness of the CMGC contract was greatly reduced because the general contractor was brought into the design process too late.	Director, San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency [August 27, 2021]	Disagree partially	While it would have been ideal to have the contractor onboard earlier, the Contractor did have a year (during pre-construction) to review the construction documents, provide comments, and familiarize itself with the conditions along the corridor. The CMGC construction contract with the Guaranteed Maximum Price was issued by SFMTA with the Contractor's concerns and input addressed. Since the prime did not involve the subcontractors directly with the City in the preconstruction process the City may not have received the full benefit of the subs' technical expertise and local knowledge. Contractor did not make the best use of its subcontractors.
Van Ness Avenue : What Lies Beneath [June 28, 2021]	F9	Underspecification in technical requirements led to additional costs for work that could have been predicted and included in the original contract.	Director, San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency [August 27, 2021]	Disagree partially	In an effort to continually improve our contract documents, we review the project specifications, in particular with multi-agency projects where various sets of specifications are merged. The Van Ness project also had the challenge of coordinating City specifications with Caltrans requirements. Specifically, in the case of the potholing and pedestrian control specifications, the contractor settled claims on these issues for less than 20% of its costs incurred, illustrating that its claim arising from purported ambiguity in the specifications had little merit. Moreover, Contractor had access to the specifications for many months during the pre-Construction period and did not request any clarification/changes at that time. Contractor raised issues with the technical requirements after the construction started.
Van Ness Avenue : What Lies Beneath [June 28, 2021]	F10	Contention over underspecified or unclear contract terms and technical requirements led to a deterioration in the relationship between the City and Walsh, the general contractor.	Director, San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency [August 27, 2021]	Disagree wholly	Language that was used in the contract was standard to all City contracts. The City worked diligently to enforce the contract in a fair and reasonable manner. The contractor did not raise any concerns about ambiguity or confusion during the year of pre-construction services or during negotiations. The CM/GC has the responsibility to raise and resolve such concerns during pre-construction. What actually led to deterioration in the relationship, in the City's view, was the contractor's concerns about the bid for the utility work.

Report Title [Publication Date]	F#	Finding	Respondent Assigned by CGJ [Response Due Date]	Finding Response (Agree/ Disagree)	Finding Response Text
Van Ness Avenue : What Lies Beneath [June 28, 2021]	F11	The removal of Synergy, the underground subcontractor, from the project, partially as a result of poor cost estimates, contributed to the deterioration of the relationship between Walsh, the general contractor, and the City.	Director, San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency [August 27, 2021]	Disagree wholly	The City supported the contractor's decision to remove its underground utility contractor, Synergy. The relationship only began to deteriorate when the contractor bid out Synergy's work and received a bid substantially more than Synergy's estimate. Over a year after Synergy was removed, Walsh filed a claim under penalty of perjury for \$11.9M arising from damages it purportedly incurred relating to Synergy's removal. That claim was resolved by the City paying the Walsh nothing on this issue.
Van Ness Avenue : What Lies Beneath [June 28, 2021]	F12	The contentious relationship between Walsh, the general contractor, and the City made it difficult to resolve problems as they arose, despite close collaboration being one of the potential advantages of the CMGC contract.	Director, San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency [August 27, 2021]	Disagree partially	Once the contractor realized that its guaranteed maximum price would not cover the cost of the utility work, the relationship became strained and the contractor became uncooperative. It appeared that the contractor was more focused on recovering the potential loss from the increased utility costs than performing a collaborative and successful project. To illustrate this, the contractor hired additional personnel to focus on claims, and used field staff to assist with the claims process rather than devoting resources to the project. The contractor's lack of experienced field staff required the City to hire a utility coordinator and other staff to facilitate the contractor's coordination with third party utilities and to resolve basic field issues. As a CM/GC, it was the contractor's responsibility to coordinate day-to-day activities with third party utilities. In spite of the challenging situation, field staff maintained a professional relationship.

Report Title [Publication Date]	F#	Finding	Respondent Assigned by CGJ [Response Due Date]	Finding Response (Agree/ Disagree)	Finding Response Text
Van Ness Avenue : What Lies Beneath [June 28, 2021]	F13	Lack of an in-the-field point of contact between Walsh and the City during early stages of construction led to delays and increased costs on the project.	Director, San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency [August 27, 2021]	Disagree wholly	The City's Resident Engineer (RE) was (and is) the point of contact with the contractor. The RE, who has been on the Project from the beginning, along with the owner's construction management team, have always been co-located with the contractor's team. Notably, the high turnover of the contractor's management team made it difficult to coordinate with the contractor, and necessitated the City bringing the contractor up to speed at various times (and likely contributed to the delay and increased costs on the Project). The contractor's unwillingness to pothole and perform other advance investigation in a timely fashion contributed more to delays in resolving field challenges than any lack of City staff. The CM/GC should lead the field fact-finding and discovery with very little owner assistance to resolve basic field issues and coordination matters. During the construction, City staff had to supplement the contractor's team directly, performing contractor work in support of the overall effort and mitigate potential delays.
Van Ness Avenue : What Lies Beneath [June 28, 2021]	F14	Confusion related to the contractual requirements for pedestrian monitoring contributed to the deterioration of the relationship between Walsh, the general contractor, and the City.	Director, San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency [August 27, 2021]	Disagree partially	The City does not believe that the contractual requirements for pedestrian monitoring and flaggers are confusing. In the interest of public safety, the City agreed to reimburse Walsh for pedestrian monitors if (1) the contractor provided the flaggers required under the contract for pedestrian control and (2) the contractor provided advance notice to the City of the need for pedestrian monitors to support the flaggers at a particular location.

2020-21 CIVIL GRAND JURY FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND RESPONSES TO FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Report Title [Publication Date]	R# [for F#]	Recommendation	Respondent Assigned by CGJ [Response Due Date]	Recommendation Response (Implementation)	Recommendation Response Text
Van Ness Avenue : What Lies Beneath [June 28, 2021]	R1 [for F1, F2, F4, F6, F9]	By June 2022, the City should adopt a policy that all capital project feasibility plans include an itemized assessment of risks to project timelines and costs, which must be accompanied with specific procedures that will be undertaken to mitigate those risks early in the project.	Director, San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency [August 27, 2021]	Has been implemented	This process is implemented for all major capital projects and projects of particular technical complexity, and is in Section 4 (Detailed Design Phase) of the MTA's Project Operations Manual (POM).
Van Ness Avenue : What Lies Beneath [June 28, 2021]	R2 [for F1, F2, F3, F4, F6, F9]	By June 2022, the City should adopt a policy that all capital project sponsors publish, before proceeding to the construction phase, an itemized assessment of derisking activities actually performed.	Director, San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency [August 27, 2021]	Will not be implemented because it is not warranted or is not reasonable	The SFMTA believes that such information may allow bidders to take advantage of the bid process.
Van Ness Avenue : What Lies Beneath [June 28, 2021]	R4 [for F1, F4, F6, F7]	The Board of Supervisors should direct all City departments to adopt a policy that all projects that involve underground work in the City's main corridors include, as part of the design process, the use of exploratory potholing, or another equivalent industry best-practice to identify unknown underground obstructions adhering to CI/ASCE 38-02 ("Standard Guideline for the Collection and Depiction of Existing Subsurface Utility Data") Quality Level A. This policy should take effect for all contracts signed after January 1, 2022, and the work should be required to be performed before final construction terms or prices are agreed to.	Director, San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency [August 27, 2021]	Will not be implemented because it is not warranted or is not reasonable	One policy for all projects is impractical. Each department must make a determination on a project-by-project basis based on the risk assessment. Currently, all major City projects that involve underground work in main corridors do incorporate potholing, or other equivalent appropriate industry practices to identify unknown underground obstructions. The City is also working more closely with private utilities (e.g., PG&E, Comcast, ATT) during design phase of major projects to account for their utilities, whether active, deactivated, or abandoned.

2020-21 CIVIL GRAND JURY FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND RESPONSES TO FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Report Title [Publication Date]	R# [for F#]	Recommendation	Respondent Assigned by CGJ [Response Due Date]	Recommendation Response (Implementation)	Recommendation Response Text
Van Ness Avenue : What Lies Beneath [June 28, 2021]	R5 [for F8, F10, F11, F12, F13]	By June 2022, and before entering into future CMGC relationships, the Board of Supervisors should direct all City departments to adopt, publish, and enforce in all future contracts industry-standard best practices for management of CMGC projects.	Director, San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency [August 27, 2021]	Will not be implemented because it is not warranted or is not reasonable	It is current practice that "best practices" are researched and applied, to the extent applicable and possible. It is up to the individual department to determine the applicability of "best practices" to their projects.
Van Ness Avenue : What Lies Beneath [June 28, 2021]	R6 [for F8]	The adopted CMGC management policy should specifically include the industry best practice of awarding the contract before project design continues past 30% completion.	Director, San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency [August 27, 2021]	Will not be implemented because it is not warranted or is not reasonable	While it is optimal to bring in a CM/GC contractor on or before 30%, it is equally important to have a qualified, experienced contractor who is able to provide the required services. In the case of a horizontal CM/GC project, the technical capability and local experience of the contractor are also important.
Van Ness Avenue : What Lies Beneath [June 28, 2021]	R7 [for F5]	By June 2022, the Board of Supervisors should amend Section 6.68 of the Administrative Code to remove the mandatory cost criterion in awarding CMGC contracts.	Director, San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency [August 27, 2021]	Requires further analysis	The SFMTA agrees with this recommendation, but implementation of the recommendation resides with the Board of Supervisors.
Van Ness Avenue : What Lies Beneath [June 28, 2021]	R8 [for F7, F9, F10]	SFMTA should establish a policy for review of technical quality of preconstruction and design deliverables, to be used in all CMGC or design contracts signed after January 2022, including in-the-field validation of key assumptions of site conditions by City engineers.	Director, San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency [August 27, 2021]	Has not yet been implemented but will be implemented in the future	A more formalized process of reviewing and commenting on pre-construction deliverables would be beneficial in the future. The SFMTA will establish the policy for all future CMGC-type projects.
Van Ness Avenue : What Lies Beneath [June 28, 2021]	R9 [for F12, F13]	Beginning January 1, 2022, SFMTA should assign to every CMGC project a dedicated in-the-field contractor liaison to facilitate collaborative problem resolution, and sufficient support staff to monitor actual progress and site conditions.	Director, San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency [August 27, 2021]	Has been implemented	This is the function of the resident engineer, a position that is common to all City construction projects.

2020-21 CIVIL GRAND JURY FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND RESPONSES TO FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Report Title [Publication Date]	R# [for F#]	Recommendation	Respondent Assigned by CGJ [Response Due Date]	Recommendation Response (Implementation)	Recommendation Response Text
Van Ness Avenue : What Lies Beneath [June 28, 2021]	R10 [for F1, F2, F6, F9]	By June 2022, the City should adopt a policy that any public communication about a planned or in-progress capital project that includes disruption of public services or right-of-way should include itemized assessments of risk to projected costs and duration.	Director, San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency [August 27, 2021]	Will not be implemented because it is not warranted or is not reasonable	The department can provide a general list of project risks and duration. Publishing an itemized assessment of risk to projected costs and duration could negatively impact the bidding or negotiation process, as applicable.
Van Ness Avenue : What Lies Beneath [June 28, 2021]	R11 [for F14]	Beginning immediately, and in all future capital or maintenance projects that require pedestrian monitors, the City should ensure that associated costs are either specifically included in the primary construction contract, or explicitly planned for and funded by the City, before construction begins.	Director, San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency [August 27, 2021]	Has been implemented	Agreed.